...a substitute for natural selection
2010-08-23 17:37:40 UTC
Stalin’s career is a lesson in coalition strategy. Take three
spectacular and consequential episodes on different political levels.
First, after Lenin died in 1924 there followed a long period of
internal political maneuvers in the Bolshevik party. The “triumvirate”
of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin opposed Trotsky. When Trotsky’s party
position was weakened, the “triumvirate” dissolved. Stalin formed a
new coalition with Bukharin (including also Rykov and Tomsky), and
this group opposed Trotsky on the one hand and the combination of
Zinoviev and Kamenev on the other.
After various moves and countermoves in the course of which Zinoviev
and Kamenev were weakened, the latter uncertainly joined with their
former opponent, Trotsky. The issue of power thus was drawn between
two combinations. According to the Bolshevik rules no holds were
barred. Few ethical or other rigidities complicated the game, unless
they were represented by Trotsky’s inhibitions. Nothing was needed
more by these men than a little game theory, and only one had it. Here
in schematic outline is what appears to have happened:
From 1921, the New Economic Policy, favoring a certain amount of
private enterprise, had been functioning in Russia.) Trotsky, the
“leftist,” was for an early turn to highspeed industrialization and
collectivization. Bukharin, the “rightist,” fearing the political
consequences of rapid collectivization, stood for a more gradual
change of economic policy (and there were other disagreements).
Whether policy or party power was the stronger motive is a moot point.
It appears, however, that Stalin did not forcefully represent a policy
here. His forte as “secretary” had been organization, that is, the
establishing of the inner-party bureaucratic pay-offs. Bukharin and
Stalin (with others) had the power to eliminate Trotsky from the scene
and the immediate game, and did so in 1927.
Trotsky for his part appears to have made no serious effort to prevent
this coalition or to break it up by offering a price that would break
it up, or at any rate, make it insecure. The expulsion of Trotsky was
fatal to Bukharin. For Stalin and Bukharin then immediately went into
a struggle. In this two—man game, Stalin, a minority interest when
Trotsky was present, found himself, perhaps not to his surprise, in
the dominating position. Bukharin was forthwith disposed of. Stalin
pursued the policy of rapid industrialization and collectivization
(Five Year Plan). In the next few years all real or potential
challengers were physically eliminated. This was the denouement of the
inner Bolshevik struggle, ending in the “stability” of Stalinist
absolutism. The next episode took place in 1932 as Hitler approached
power in Germany.)
In Germany there was a three-man game in progress between the
Socialists, Communists, and Fascists. None had a majority. Any
coalition would win. The Socialists lacked a coalition policy and
opposed more or less equally both Communists and Fascists. Stalin, in
control of the Communists, forbade an alliance with the Socialists;
this took the form of an oiiicial theory of “social fascism,”
according to which the Socialists were the greater enemy.
Stalin, in other words, declared a negative coalition with the
Fascists against the Socialists. Apparently he wished to obtain a
monopoly of the German left and to play out a two—man game against
Hitler; and the negative coalition enabled him to use Fascist as well
as Communist power to destroy the Socialists. Hitler was willing. He
got the Chancellorship from Hindenburg and went in and cut down both
oppositions. The two-man game between the Communists and Fascists
failed to materialize within Germany.
The third episode is familiar. The historic British “balance of power”
policy, which was intended to prevent a coalition between France and
Germany, dwindled—in the presence of Soviet Russia and Fascist Germany
to a “policy” of indecision. Several big nations jockeyed for
international coalition positions throughout the thirties. Stalin
went with Hitler in 1939.
Hitler made his defection in 1941, and Stalin came together with the
Allies. During the past war certain concessions to Stalin made by
Roosevelt and Churchill were defended on the ground that they were
necessary to maintain the coalition, that is, to prevent Stalin’s
defection from the Allies. The assumption was that altemative
solutions existed for Stalin and that continuous payments to him were
required to maintain the stability of the coalition against the Axis.
Since the war, the combinative nature of society appears to be
resolving world politics into a two—man game. Each side is engaged in
clarifying its inner organization--albeit on different ethical,
social, and political principles—and in conducting its outer struggle
in a cold-war duel. Yet not every player on the world scene is
committed, so that the three—or-more-person game remains the model of
international affairs.
Some games end in revolutions, from which something may be learned.
Any income distribution is under attack in society. Revolutions are
based in good part upon organizing and extending existing social
hostilities on the model of another and “different” distribution. Yet
societies with inequitable distribution, dissatisfaction, and inner
conflict show stability for long periods of time.
Game theory models indicate that an inequitable organization is
protected by a kind of similarity of alternative arrangements. A
coalition cannot be broken except by a vastly different distribution,
which is diflicult to devise. If the "revolutionaries" find a
situation in which their proposals can prevail, they immediately come
under attack, and once the revolution is in motion, it is difficult to
make it stable, that is, to find a distribution that can no longer be
upset. All distributions become unstable as competing groups seek
their own revolutions in a multiplicity of possible arrangements.
This suggests a possible cause of the absolute and repressive
solutions found respectively by Napoleon and Stalin in the French and
Russian revolutions. Both revolutions began in good part with
widespread libertarian motives and reached an opposite conclusion. The
intermediate struggles, including such modern refinements as purge
trials, may reflect the forceful elimination of alternative
solutions.
The model suggests also the rationale of democratic socialist
gradualism which seeks to avoid the problem of restoring order by
making changes in the direction of socialism without upsetting the
whole order at once. This of course is speculation quite apart from
the strict mathematical treatise.
The complete book: http://amzn.to/aJ9XAZ
spectacular and consequential episodes on different political levels.
First, after Lenin died in 1924 there followed a long period of
internal political maneuvers in the Bolshevik party. The “triumvirate”
of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin opposed Trotsky. When Trotsky’s party
position was weakened, the “triumvirate” dissolved. Stalin formed a
new coalition with Bukharin (including also Rykov and Tomsky), and
this group opposed Trotsky on the one hand and the combination of
Zinoviev and Kamenev on the other.
After various moves and countermoves in the course of which Zinoviev
and Kamenev were weakened, the latter uncertainly joined with their
former opponent, Trotsky. The issue of power thus was drawn between
two combinations. According to the Bolshevik rules no holds were
barred. Few ethical or other rigidities complicated the game, unless
they were represented by Trotsky’s inhibitions. Nothing was needed
more by these men than a little game theory, and only one had it. Here
in schematic outline is what appears to have happened:
From 1921, the New Economic Policy, favoring a certain amount of
private enterprise, had been functioning in Russia.) Trotsky, the
“leftist,” was for an early turn to highspeed industrialization and
collectivization. Bukharin, the “rightist,” fearing the political
consequences of rapid collectivization, stood for a more gradual
change of economic policy (and there were other disagreements).
Whether policy or party power was the stronger motive is a moot point.
It appears, however, that Stalin did not forcefully represent a policy
here. His forte as “secretary” had been organization, that is, the
establishing of the inner-party bureaucratic pay-offs. Bukharin and
Stalin (with others) had the power to eliminate Trotsky from the scene
and the immediate game, and did so in 1927.
Trotsky for his part appears to have made no serious effort to prevent
this coalition or to break it up by offering a price that would break
it up, or at any rate, make it insecure. The expulsion of Trotsky was
fatal to Bukharin. For Stalin and Bukharin then immediately went into
a struggle. In this two—man game, Stalin, a minority interest when
Trotsky was present, found himself, perhaps not to his surprise, in
the dominating position. Bukharin was forthwith disposed of. Stalin
pursued the policy of rapid industrialization and collectivization
(Five Year Plan). In the next few years all real or potential
challengers were physically eliminated. This was the denouement of the
inner Bolshevik struggle, ending in the “stability” of Stalinist
absolutism. The next episode took place in 1932 as Hitler approached
power in Germany.)
In Germany there was a three-man game in progress between the
Socialists, Communists, and Fascists. None had a majority. Any
coalition would win. The Socialists lacked a coalition policy and
opposed more or less equally both Communists and Fascists. Stalin, in
control of the Communists, forbade an alliance with the Socialists;
this took the form of an oiiicial theory of “social fascism,”
according to which the Socialists were the greater enemy.
Stalin, in other words, declared a negative coalition with the
Fascists against the Socialists. Apparently he wished to obtain a
monopoly of the German left and to play out a two—man game against
Hitler; and the negative coalition enabled him to use Fascist as well
as Communist power to destroy the Socialists. Hitler was willing. He
got the Chancellorship from Hindenburg and went in and cut down both
oppositions. The two-man game between the Communists and Fascists
failed to materialize within Germany.
The third episode is familiar. The historic British “balance of power”
policy, which was intended to prevent a coalition between France and
Germany, dwindled—in the presence of Soviet Russia and Fascist Germany
to a “policy” of indecision. Several big nations jockeyed for
international coalition positions throughout the thirties. Stalin
went with Hitler in 1939.
Hitler made his defection in 1941, and Stalin came together with the
Allies. During the past war certain concessions to Stalin made by
Roosevelt and Churchill were defended on the ground that they were
necessary to maintain the coalition, that is, to prevent Stalin’s
defection from the Allies. The assumption was that altemative
solutions existed for Stalin and that continuous payments to him were
required to maintain the stability of the coalition against the Axis.
Since the war, the combinative nature of society appears to be
resolving world politics into a two—man game. Each side is engaged in
clarifying its inner organization--albeit on different ethical,
social, and political principles—and in conducting its outer struggle
in a cold-war duel. Yet not every player on the world scene is
committed, so that the three—or-more-person game remains the model of
international affairs.
Some games end in revolutions, from which something may be learned.
Any income distribution is under attack in society. Revolutions are
based in good part upon organizing and extending existing social
hostilities on the model of another and “different” distribution. Yet
societies with inequitable distribution, dissatisfaction, and inner
conflict show stability for long periods of time.
Game theory models indicate that an inequitable organization is
protected by a kind of similarity of alternative arrangements. A
coalition cannot be broken except by a vastly different distribution,
which is diflicult to devise. If the "revolutionaries" find a
situation in which their proposals can prevail, they immediately come
under attack, and once the revolution is in motion, it is difficult to
make it stable, that is, to find a distribution that can no longer be
upset. All distributions become unstable as competing groups seek
their own revolutions in a multiplicity of possible arrangements.
This suggests a possible cause of the absolute and repressive
solutions found respectively by Napoleon and Stalin in the French and
Russian revolutions. Both revolutions began in good part with
widespread libertarian motives and reached an opposite conclusion. The
intermediate struggles, including such modern refinements as purge
trials, may reflect the forceful elimination of alternative
solutions.
The model suggests also the rationale of democratic socialist
gradualism which seeks to avoid the problem of restoring order by
making changes in the direction of socialism without upsetting the
whole order at once. This of course is speculation quite apart from
the strict mathematical treatise.
The complete book: http://amzn.to/aJ9XAZ